The Treaty of Versailles Debate and the Role of the Constitution
U.S. History lesson, Grades 9-12

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Overview:

In this lesson, students will use primary and secondary sources as well as a simulation to analyze and evaluate the debate surrounding the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. By examining the different sides to the debate and actively researching each role, they will understand how the Constitution was at the heart of the argument over the decision to become part of an international organization. Analyzing the history surrounding the post-war years and focusing especially on the civil unrest in 1919 will enhance students’ understanding of this critical period in our history. Upon completion, students will be able to explain the different sides to an important topic that still resonates in our nation today: what role should America play in foreign affairs, and how can we look to the Constitution to guide our decisions?

Purpose:
To evaluate various sides to the debate surrounding the Treaty of Versailles and, specifically, Article X of the League Covenant regarding the League of Nations.

Connections to the Curriculum:
U.S. History, AP U.S. History

Grade level:
9-12

Time:
2 class periods

Objectives:
1. Students will use information from original text sources to explain major points within the Treaty of Versailles, the League of Nations, and the areas in the Constitution dealing with treaties and powers related to foreign relations.
2. Students will demonstrate application of the historian’s skills of asking historical questions, acquiring historical information, and answering historical questions.
3. Students will engage in a simulation on the debate surrounding the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles and understand what led to the treaty’s ultimate defeat.

NCSS Thematic Strands

1. “Power, Authority, and Governance: Social Studies programs should include experiences that provide for how people study of how people create, interact with, and change structures of power, authority, and governance.”

2. “Global Connections: Social Studies programs should include experiences that provide for the study of global connections and interdependence.”

Ohio’s New Common Core Learning Standards, Social Studies, American History

Topic: Foreign Affairs from Imperialism to Post-World War I, 1898-1930

Content Statement 16: After WWI, the United States pursued efforts to maintain peace in the world. However, as a result of the national debate over the Versailles Treaty ratification and the League of Nations, the United States moved away from the role of world peacekeeper and limited its involvement in international affairs.

Materials Needed:

Constitution: Article 2, Section 2
Constitution: Article 1, Section 8
Copy of the Treaty of Versailles: Main Points, from the Center for Learning
Copy of the Fourteen Points
Copy of the Lodge Reservations
Role cards for each participant

Background Information/Homework/Pre-Learning:

Students should read their assigned roles and information before the simulation. Also, it is helpful for students to have an understanding of America in 1919, including the rising fear of immigrants, the first Red Scare and the creation of the FBI, the post-war economic struggles, and unrest such as the Chicago Riot of 1919, the Boston Police Strike, etc. This will help the students who have the roles of “citizens” make informed choices about what side they would support.

Essential Question: Are U.S. interests protected better when foreign policy leans toward Isolationism or leans toward Interventionism?
Procedures: NOTE: Prior to Day 1, students should be assigned or allowed to select their roles. In this way, they can keep a critical eye open for any information that will help them in the text provided.

Day 1:

1. Students should meet with their respective teams: Big Four, Senate Democrats, Irreconcilable Senators, Reservationist Senators, and Citizens.

2. Within their teams, they should comb through the Constitution, the Bailey article, the Fourteen Points, and the highlights of the Treaty of Versailles to find specific data that will help them make a strong case to either support or refute the Treaty. It is helpful to put these in folders for each group to reference. Citizens must decide individually if they believe that the Treaty (including the League of Nations) will lead to a lasting peace. If not, they need to find evidence to support this. If so, they should be ready to share why with specific data.

3. Students should be reminded to specifically and critically examine the Constitution. What does it say about the powers of Congress and especially the Senate in declaring war and ratifying treaties? Why might Senators take issue with Article X of the League Covenant? What does it say about the President’s role in foreign policy, and how does Wilson interpret this in the creation of the Treaty?

4. Follow the meeting “agenda” from the “Call to Order” by President Wilson and his friends in his Fourteen Points. Allowing Wilson and the Big Four to explain what they like and dislike about the Treaty of Versailles, Wilson’s reasons of why he and many Democrats are frustrated with the Treaty. If time permits, allow the groups of Senators to explain their support or disdain for the Treaty and specific reasons why.

Day 2

1. Continue (or begin) hearing from each group of Senators. Try to guide the students playing the Senators to look at the role the Constitution plays in their ideas. The Bailey article also has some great information on this topic, specifically pertaining to Senator Lodge and his Reservations.

2. Allow each citizen to present his/her view to the Senators and the Big Four. It’s important to note that this did not actually happen, however, this is a great chance to see how average, ordinary Americans reacted to the Treaty and to the events unfolding in the post-war world that would have made it hard for the Treaty to be ratified without major changes. Again, guide each citizen to look at the actual wording of the Constitution to guide their decisions. Was Wilson within his power or abusing it by asking for the Treaty to be ratified?

3. Interrupting with “breaking news” can be really helpful to get the citizens to really interact and get involved! For instance, you could announce how bombs went off that prompted
the Palmer Raids to encourage students that are playing isolationist roles to react strongly to the events. Any events or statistics (economic) are great for this!

4. Final vote on the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles. This can be done as a whole or be done just by the Senators; I find both ways to be effective. To ensure the vote is historically accurate, be sure to have the Senate Democrats be a smaller group than the Irreconcilables and Reservationists.

5. Read the “Nightly News” about President Wilson’s speaking tour and subsequent stroke, as well as the defeat of the Treaty in the Senate. Make connections to the Election of 1920 and the victory of “Normalcy” over internationalism.

Assessment:

I typically assess the statements made by each student in their accuracy and how well they have used the required primary and secondary sources. Did they play their role accurately? Did they pull in the Constitution and specific data from the article and our textbook? If desired, you can have students submit a 1-2 paragraph explanation of their role.

Extension/Enrichment:

Ask the students, “Who is to blame here?” This one question usually leads to a fabulous discussion about why the Treaty failed. Pick 2-3 people (or things/themes) that are to “blame,” and have a “trial” for which should get the blame for the Treaty’s failure.

The AP US History 1991 Document-Based Question is a fabulous activity for students to examine and/or write after completing this simulation.

Students can also make parallels between this period and our current foreign policy with the debate over the role of the U.S. and the United Nations. When and how is it appropriate and Constitutional for the United States to take part in United Nations actions? What would Woodrow Wilson say about the United States actions in more recent years with or without the United Nations? What would Woodrow Wilson or Henry Lodge say about U.S. foreign policy today? Students can create iMovie documentaries as “letters to the future” from Wilson which explain these views.

Websites:


Table of WWI Casualties: http://www.pbs.org/greatwar/resources/casdeath_pop.html

Text of the U.S. Constitution: http://constitutioncenter.org/constitution/full-text
Meeting to Discuss the Ratification of the Treaty of Versailles: Agenda

September 7, 1919

In Attendance Today: Woodrow Wilson, U.S. President; David Lloyd George, British Prime
Minister; Georges Clemenceau, French Premier; Vittorio Orlando, Italian
Prime Minister; U.S. Senators, and Citizens of the United States of America

Agenda for Today's Meeting:

Welcome and call to order: President Wilson

Explanation of main points of Treaty of Versailles: Big Four

Wilson explains his frustration with the Treaty of Versailles, yet the need for ACTION and
SUPPORT of the Treaty

Views from the "Reservationist" Senators

Views from the "Irreconcilable" Senators

Views from the Senate Democrats

Wilson moderates open debate on League of Nations led by Citizens of the United States. YOU
MUST NOT SPEAK UNLESS RECOGNIZED BY THE PRESIDENT (or points will be deducted
from YOUR score!)

Citizens vote on accepting the League of Nations

Nightly News will be read by Mrs. Ziemnik
**President Woodrow Wilson**

You are the leader of the United States. You are determined to leave your mark on history by creating a way for the world to avoid another horrible war like the one that has just occurred. You’ve got some great ideas for peace (view the Fourteen Points to find them). The League of Nations you wish to create will stop a war of this magnitude from ever happening again. However, some of your very own Senators believe that it will unnecessarily drag us into messy European affairs, and they are threatening to reject it! If they could only see your way they’d understand that this is the only way to avoid ever being dragged into European wars again! Making them understand this should be your goal.

At today’s meeting you have a chance to do just that and more. First, explain all your reasons that you are frustrated with the Treaty of Versailles and the punishments it places upon Germany. Emphasize why you believe the League of Nations is the only way to stop future aggression and wars. Then, listen to the views of the other groups here. You will then moderate an open debate between the various people in attendance. They cannot speak unless recognized BY YOU. Get this Treaty passed, or another World War is inevitable! Don’t go down in history as a President that couldn’t convince his people that a League was necessary. It certainly is not perfect, and it most definitely is not everything you hoped for, but it is the best that you could possibly do. Make the Senators and citizens understand this, using the Constitution, the Bailey article, your textbook, and other sources provided.

**Members of the Big Four: David Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau, and Vittorio Orlando**

You are determined to leave your mark on history by creating a way for the world to avoid another horrible war like the one that has just occurred. You’ve got some great ideas for peace, yet you believe this war must have a winner and a loser. The League of Nations Wilson wishes to create will supposedly stop a war of this magnitude from ever happening again. Gather data to find out how this war affected the lives of people in your respective countries, and present this so that citizens will understand why you demand justice.

Be ready to present the highlights of the Treaty of Versailles you have worked so hard to create. Be ready to have some pushback on Article X from the Senators, and be prepared to fight for it to be included in the final document.

Be sure to also tell the attendees what you think is WRONG with some of the Fourteen Point and why you believe PUNISHMENTS upon Germany are absolutely vital. Be specific and describe the punishments and changes to the map that have been made. Get this League of Nations passed—or another World War is inevitable! Don’t go down in history as a group of leaders that couldn’t convince the world that a League was necessary!
US Senators: William Borah and “The Irreconcilables”

THIS IS AN OUTRAGE! You have just watched your country’s economy plunge, people’s rights trampled upon, and over 100,000 American lives lost in a pointless war started in that nationalistic mess called EUROPE! You are very bitter that your country was sucked into this war and it has done nothing to help America. You’re left with a bumbling economy, increased tensions in the cities, and thousands of dead Americans. You ABSOLUTELY do NOT want a war of this magnitude to happen again! THAT IS WHY YOU OPPOSE ANY RIDICULOUS “LEAGUE OF NATIONS.” The last thing America needs is to be in an entangling alliance with these European countries. Look what good alliances did to the world before the war. And Wilson expects you to support the creation of one gigantic alliance? What if this League declares war without YOUR consent? In THIS country, only CONGRESS has the power to declare war. You absolutely don’t want to give up that right, and you MUST use the Constitution to explain this.

Prepare a statement, using information from the Bailey article, the Constitution, and other documents provided to explain your views to the other senators and to the citizens of the US who are in attendance. Make it clear to these leaders that you will NOT vote to become a part of a messy alliance that will only lead to another horrifying war.

US Senators: The “Reservationists”, led by Henry Cabot Lodge

This war was devastating for Europe and also for your country. You have lost over 100,000 American lives, and your economy is in shambles. Your President, Woodrow Wilson, supports the Big Four in leading the Fourteen Points: including a League of Nations. Look in your textbook to get information about this League and how you feel about it. Examine the wording of the Constitution and what powers it grants you, the Senators. What are your fears here? What are your suggestions? Insist that the treaty will only be ratified with some changes, and look in the sources provided to create a strong argument explaining what changes you desire and why.

Prepare a statement, using the Bailey article, the Constitution, and other documents provided to explain your views to the other senators and to the citizens of the US who are in attendance. Remember, the world’s fate lies in your hands.

Senate Democrats

You are somewhat disappointed with the Treaty that President Wilson brought home. Why is this? What did he promise in his Fourteen Points, and what happened in the Treaty? Make it known the problems you have with the treaty, but you still support the Treaty despite its flaws. Look specifically at the Constitution and what it says about the powers of the President and of Congress. Now, look at the highlights of the Treaty, especially Article X. You want to focus on this and why the League of Nations is a good thing and not an abuse of power. Gather information from the Constitution, the Bailey article, your textbook, and the sources provided to help you create a strong argument.
Citizens of the United States of America

You’ve been invited to this important meeting to hear the plans to avoid another war. Listen to each side present their ideas. Think about what is affecting YOUR LIFE in 1919. From your chosen perspective, explain why you support or oppose a League and ask a member of the panel (Wilson, The Big Four, Senate Democrats, The “Irreconcilable” Senators or the “Reservationist” Senators) questions to find the holes in their argument. The fate of this country lies in your hands. Make them defend their positions and try to back them into a corner. They may have the final vote on the Treaty, but in this democracy, you have the final vote on their job! See the Bailey article on the League of Nations, the actual text of the Constitution and what it says about the powers of Congress and the President, your textbook, and other documents provided to help you raise valuable points in our debate.

Choose an identity to assume for today:

1. Caroline Smith, an Illinois farmwife who has lost 3 of her 4 sons to WWI
2. Tom Miller, an African-American factory worker in a steel mill in Cleveland, who is working to save up money to get his family up to Ohio, too
3. Janek Slavich, a recent immigrant from the Ukraine who is working in a NYC factory and has family members in Europe affected by the war
4. Thomas Jones, wealthy owner of the Shirts-R-Us Textile Mill in Philadelphia, PA: concerned about economic issues
5. Michael Warner, a veteran of WWI who lost his leg in the trench warfare on the Western front
6. Joe Hutchinson, a married father of 3 who lives in a comfortable home outside Pittsburgh, PA and makes a modest living
7. Emma Morgan, a New Jersey woman whose husband is still stationed overseas, she is working in a steel mill in Newark
8. Hans Witterstaetter, a recent immigrant from Germany who is frustrated by war but also angry over the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, works in a coal mine in West Virginia
9. Elizabeth Kyles, an army nurse who has seen the horrors of war firsthand in France and lost her brother in combat.
10. Sergei Ivanov, a recent Russian immigrant who was thrown in jail for advocating strikes in his Boston steel mill.
The Senate and the League of Nations

I. Henry Cabot Lodge: Reservations with Regard to the Treaty

Resolved (two-thirds of the senators present concurring therein), that the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of the treaty of peace with Germany concluded at Versailles on the 28th day of June, 1919, subject to the following reservations and understandings, which are hereby made a part and condition of this resolution of ratification, which ratification is not to take effect or bind the United States until the said reservations and understandings adopted by the Senate have been accepted by an exchange of notes as a part and a condition of this resolution of ratification by at least three of the four principal allied and associated powers, to wit, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan:

1. The United States so understands and construes Article I that in case of notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations, as provided in said article, the United States shall be the sole judge as to whether all its international obligations and all its obligations under the said Covenant have been fulfilled, and notice of withdrawal by the United States may be given by a concurrent resolution of the Congress of the United States.

2. The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country or to interfere in controversies between nations -- whether members of the League or not -- under the provisions of Article 10, or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States under any article of the treaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, which, under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war or authorize the employment of the military or naval forces of the United States, shall by act or joint resolution so provide.

3. No mandate shall be accepted by the United States under Article 22, Part 1, or any other provision of the treaty of peace with Germany, except by action of the Congress of the United States.

4. The United States reserves to itself exclusively the right to decide what questions are within its domestic jurisdiction and declares that all domestic and political questions relating wholly or in part to its internal affairs, including immigration, labor, coastwise traffic, the tariff, commerce, the suppression of traffic in women and children, and in opium and other dangerous drugs, and all other domestic questions, are solely within the jurisdiction of the United States and are not under this treaty to be submitted in any way either to arbitration or to the consideration of the Council or of the Assembly of the League of Nations, or any agency thereof, or to the decision or recommendation of any other power.

5. The United States will not submit to arbitration or to inquiry by the Assembly or by the Council of the League of Nations provided for in said treaty of peace any questions which in the judgment of the United States depend upon or relate to its long-established policy, commonly known as the Monroe Doctrine; said doctrine is to be interpreted by the United States alone and is hereby declared to be wholly outside the jurisdiction of said League of Nations and entirely unaffected by any provision contained in the said treaty of peace with Germany.

6. The United States withholds its assent to Articles 156, 157, and 158, and reserves full liberty of action with respect to any controversy which may arise under said articles between the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan.

7. The Congress of the United States will provide by law for the appointment of the representatives of the United States in the Assembly and the Council of the League of Nations, and may in its discretion provide for the participation of the United States in any commission, committee, tribunal, court, council, or conference, or in the selection of any members thereof, and for the appointment of members of said commissions, committees, tribunals, courts, councils, or conferences, or any other representatives under the treaty of peace, or in carrying out its provisions; and until such participation and appointment have been so provided for and the powers

https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/doc41.htm
and duties of such representatives have been defined by law, no person shall represent the United States under either said League of Nations or the treaty of peace with Germany or be authorized to perform any act for or on behalf of the United States thereunder; and no citizen of the United States shall be selected or appointed as a member of said commissions, committees, tribunals, courts, councils, or conferences except with the approval of the Senate of the United States.

8. The United States understands that the Reparation Commission will regulate or interfere with exports from the United States to Germany, or from Germany to the United States, only when the United States by act or joint resolution of Congress approves such regulation or interference.

9. The United States shall not be obligated to contribute to any expenses of the League of Nations, or of the Secretariat, or of any commission, or committee, or conference, or other agency organized under the League of Nations or under the treaty or for the purpose of carrying out the treaty provisions, unless and until an appropriation of funds available for such expenses shall have been made by the Congress of the United States.

10. If the United States shall at any time adopt any plan for the limitation of armaments proposed by the Council of the League of Nations under the provisions of Article 8, it reserves the right to increase such armaments without the consent of the Council whenever the United States is threatened with invasion or engaged in war.

11. The United States reserves the right to permit, in its discretion, the nationals of a Covenant-breaking state, as defined in Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, residing within the United States or in countries other than that violating said Article 16, to continue their commercial, financial, and personal relations with the nationals of the United States.

12. Nothing in Articles 296, 297, or in any of the annexes thereto or in any other article, section, or annex of the treaty of peace with Germany shall, as against citizens of the United States, be taken to mean any confirmation, ratification, or approval of any act otherwise illegal or in contravention of the rights of citizens of the United States.

13. The United States withholds its assent to Part XIII (Articles 387 to 427, inclusive) unless Congress by act or joint resolution shall hereafter make provision for representation in the organization established by said Part XII, and in such event the participation of the United States will be governed and conditioned by the provisions of such act or joint resolution.

14. The United States assumes no obligation to be bound by any election, decision, report, or finding of the Council or Assembly in which any member of the League and its self-governing dominions, colonies, or parts of empire, in the aggregate, have cast more than one vote, and assumes no obligation to be bound by any decision, report, or finding of the Council or Assembly arising out of any dispute between the United States and any member of the League if such member, or any self-governing dominion, colony, empire, or part of empire united with it politically has voted.

II. Senate Debate

Mr. Lodge. Mr. President, I have received from the press a copy of a letter which has been given out, I understand, and which I think, as the senator from Nebraska [Mr. Hitchcock] has not offered it, should be read at this time before we vote . . . .

The White House,

Washington, 18 November, 1,919.

My Dear Senator: You were good enough to bring me word that the Democratic senators supporting the treaty expected to hold a conference before the final vote on the Lodge resolution of ratification and that they would be glad to receive a word of counsel from me.

I should hesitate to offer it in any detail, but I assume that the senators only desire my judgment upon the
The Treaty of Versailles

Part A. Use the following excerpts from the Treaty of Versailles as a resource in completing the homework activity that follows.

Article 10: The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

Article 42: Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometers to the East of the Rhine.

Article 45: As compensation for the destruction of the coal-mines in the north of France and as payment toward the total reparations due from Germany for the damage resulting from the war, Germany cedes to France in full and absolute possession, with exclusive rights of exploitation, unencumbered and free from all debts and charges of any kind, the coal-mines situated in the Saar Basin as defined in Article 48.

Article 51: The territories [Alsace-Lorraine] which were ceded to Germany in accordance with the Preliminaries of Peace signed at Versailles on February 26, 1871, and the Treaty of Frankfort of May 10, 1871, are restored to French sovereignty as from the date of the Armistice of November 11, 1918.

Article 119: Germany renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her overseas possessions.

Article 159: The German military forces shall be demobilized and reduced as prescribed hereinafter.

Article 160: ... After that date [March 31, 1920] the total number of effectives in the Army of the States constituting Germany must not exceed one hundred thousand men.

Article 170: Importation into Germany of Arms, munitions and war material of every kind shall be strictly prohibited.

Article 181: After the expiration of a period of two months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, the German naval forces in commission must not exceed: 6 battleships, 6 light cruisers, 12 destroyers, 12 torpedo boats, or an equal number of ships constructed to replace them as provided in Article 190. No submarines are to be included.

Article 198: The armed forces of Germany must not include any military or naval air forces.

Article 231: The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

Article 232: The Allied and Associated Governments recognize that the resources of Germany are not adequate, after taking into account permanent diminutions of such resources which will result from other provisions of the Treaty, to make complete reparations for all such loss and damages.

The Allied and Associated Governments, however, require, and Germany undertakes, that she will make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their property during the period of the belligerency of each as an Allied or Associated Power against Germany by such aggression by land, by sea and from the air. [Later set at 856 billion.]
WOODROW WILSON WOULDN'T YIELD

While Paris cheered "Voovro" the isolationist crowds back home cried Impeach him!" and in a clash of imperious wills his dream evaporated

By THOMAS A. BAILEY

Only a quarter century before the United States took a major part in forming the United Nations at San Francisco in 1945, the same nation sharply turned its back on the predecessor world organization, the League of Nations, and broke the heart of its stubborn, idealistic architect. The story of this great negative decision, still a matter of debate, is examined here by Thomas A. Bailey, Byrne Professor of American History at Stanford University, in the final article of the series, "Times of Trial in American Statecraft."

The story of America's rejection of the League of Nations revolves largely around the personality and character of Thomas Woodrow Wilson.

Born in Virginia and reared in Yankee-gutted Georgia and the Carolinas, Wilson early developed a burning hatred of war and a passionate attachment to the Confederate-embraced principle of self-determination for minority peoples. From the writings of Thomas Jefferson he derived much of his democratic idealism and his invincible faith in the judgment of the masses, if properly informed. From his stiff-backed Scotch-Presbyterian forebears, he inherited a high degree of inflexibility; from his father, a dedicated Presbyterian minister, he learned a stern moral code that would tolerate no compromise with wrong, as defined by Woodrow Wilson.

As a leading academician who had first failed at law, he betrayed a contempt for "money-grubbing" lawyers, many of whom sat in the Senate, and an arrogance toward lesser intellects, including those of the "pygmy-minded" senators. As a devout Christian keenly aware of the wickedness of this world, he emerged as a fighting reformer, whether as president of Princeton, governor of New Jersey, or President of the United States.

As a war leader, Wilson was superb. Holding aloft the torch of idealism in one hand and the flaming sword of righteousness in the other, he aroused the masses to a holy crusade. We would fight a war to end wars; we would make the world safe for democracy. The phrase was not a mockery then. The American people, with an amazing display of self-sacrifice, supported the war effort unwaveringly.

The noblest expression of Wilson's idealism was his Fourteen Points address to Congress in January, 1918. It compressed his aims into punchy, placard-like paragraphs, expressly designed for propaganda purposes. It appealed tremendously to oppressed peoples everywhere by promising such goals as the end of secret treaties, freedom of the seas, the removal of economic barriers, a reduction of arms burdens, a fair adjustment of colonial claims, and self-determination for oppressed minorities. In Poland university men would meet on the streets of Warsaw, clasp hands, and soulfully utter one word, "Wilson." In remote regions of Italy peasants burned candles before poster portraits of the mighty new prophet arisen in the West.

The fourteenth and capstone point was a league of nations, designed to avert future wars. The basic idea was not original with Wilson; numerous thinkers, including Frenchmen and Britons, had been working on the concept long before he embraced it. Even Henry Cabot Lodge, the Republican senator from Massachusetts, had already spoken publicly in favor of a league of nations. But the more he heard about the Wilsonian League of Nations, the more critical of it he became.

A knowledge of the Wilson-Lodge feud is basic to an understanding of the tragedy that unfolded. Tall, slender, aristocratically bewhiskered, Dr. Henry Cabot Lodge (Ph.D., Harvard), had published a number of books and had been known as the scholar in politics before the appearance of Dr. Woodrow Wilson (Ph.D., Johns Hopkins). The Presbyterian professor had gone further in both scholarship and politics than the Boston Brahmin, whose mind was once described as resembling the soil of his native New England: "naturally barren but highly cultivated." Wilson and Lodge, two icy men, developed a mutual antipathy, which soon turned into freezing hatred.

The German armies, reeling under the blows of the Allies, were ready to give in by November, 1918. The formal armistice terms stipulated that Germany was to be guaranteed a peace based on the Fourteen Points, with two reservations concerning freedom of the seas and reparations.

Meanwhile the American people had keyed themselves up to the long-awaited march on Berlin; eager voices clamored to hang the Kaiser. Thus the sudden end of the shooting left inflamed patriots with a sense of frustration and letdown that boded ill for Wilson's policies. The red-faced Theodore Roosevelt, Lodge's intimate of long standing, cried that peace should be dictated by the chatter of machine guns and not the clicking of typewriters.
Wilson now towered at the dizzy pinnacle of his popularity and power. He had emerged as the moral arbiter of the world and the hope of all peoples for a better tomorrow. But regrettably his wartime sureness of touch began to desert him, and he made a series of costly fumbles. He was so preoccupied with reordering the world, someone has said, that he reminded one of the baseball player who knocks the ball into the bleachers and then forgets to touch home plate.

First came his brutally direct appeal for a Democratic Congress in October, 1918. The voters trooped to the polls the next month and, by a narrow margin, returned a Republican Congress. Wilson had not only goaded his partisan foes to fresh outbursts of fury, but he had unnecessarily staked his prestige on the outcome—and lost. When the Allied leaders met at the Paris peace table, he was the only one not entitled to be there, at least on the European basis of a parliamentary majority.

Wilson next announced that he was sailing for France, presumably to use his still enormous prestige to fashion an enduring peace. At that time no President had ever gone abroad, and Republicans condemned the decision as evidence of a dangerous Messiah complex—of a desire, as former President Taft put it, "to hog the whole show."

The naming of the remaining five men to the peace delegation caused partisans further anguish. Only one, Henry White, was a Republican, and he was a minor figure at that. The Republicans, now the majority party, complained that they had been good enough to die on the battlefield; they ought to have at least an equal voice at the peace table. Nor were any United States senators included, even though they would have a final whack at the treaty. Wilson did not have much respect for the "bungalow-minded" senators, and if he took one, the logical choice would be Henry Cabot Lodge. There were already enough feuds brewing at Paris without taking one along.

 Doubtless some of the Big Business Republicans were out to "get" the President who had been responsible for the hated reformist legislation of 1913–14. If he managed to put over the League of Nations, his prestige would soar to new heights. He might even arrange—unspeakable thought!—to be elected again and again and again. Much of the partisan smog that finally suffocated the League would have been cleared away if Wilson had publicly declared, as he was urged to do, that in no circumstances would he run again. But he spurned such counsel, partly because he was actually receptive to the idea of a third term.

The American President, hysterically hailed by European crowds as "Voovro Veelson," came to the Paris peace table in January, 1919, to meet with Lloyd George of Britain, Clemenceau of France, and Orlando of Italy. To his dismay, he soon discovered that they were far more interested in imperialism than in idealism. When they sought to carve up the territorial booty without regard for the colonies, contrary to the Fourteen Points, the stern-jawed Presbyterian moralist interposed a ringing veto. The end result was the mandate system—a compromise between idealism and imperialism that turned out to be more imperialistic than idealistic.

Wilson's overriding concern was the League of Nations. He feared that if he did not get it completed and embedded in the treaty, the imperialistic powers might sidetrack it. Working at an incredible pace after hours, Wilson headed the commission that drafted the League Covenant in ten meetings and some thirty hours. He then persuaded the conference not only to approve the hastily constructed Covenant but to incorporate it bodily in the peace treaty. In support of his adopted brain child he spoke so movingly on one occasion that even the hard-boiled reporters forgot to take notes.

Wilson now had to return hurriedly to the United States to sign bills and take care of other pressing business. Shortly after his arrival the mounting Republican opposition in the Senate faced us angry. On March 4, 1919, 39 senators or senators-elect—more than enough to defeat the treaty—published a round robin to the effect that they would not approve the League in its existing form. This meant that Wilson had to return to Paris, hat in hand, and there weaken his position by having to seek modifications.

Stung to the quick, he struck back at his senatorial foes in an indiscreet speech in New York just before his departure. He boasted that when he brought the treaty back from Paris, the League Covenant would not only be tied in but so thoroughly tied in that it could not be cut out without killing the entire pact. The Senate, he assumed, would not dare to kill the treaty of peace outright.

At Paris the battle was now joined in deadly earnest. Clemenceau, the French realist, had little use for Wilson, the American idealist. "God gave us the Ten Commandments and we broke them," he reportedly sneered. "Wilson gave us the Fourteen Points—we shall see." Clemenceau's most disruptive demand was for the German Rhineland; but Wilson, the champion of self-determination, would never consent to handing several million Germans over to the tender mercies of the French. After a furious struggle, during which Wilson was stricken with influenza, Clemenceau was finally persuaded to yield the Rhineland and other demands in return for a security treaty. Under it, Britain and America agreed to come to the aid of France in the event of another unprovoked aggression. The United States Senate shortsightedly pigeonholed the pact, and France was left with neither the Rhineland nor security.
Two other deadlocks almost broke up the conference. Italy claimed the Adriatic port of Fincian, an area inhabited chiefly by Yugoslavs. In his battle for self-determination, Wilson dramatically appealed over the head of the Italian delegation to the Italian people, whereupon the delegates went home in a huff to receive popular endorsement. The final adjustment was a hollow victory for self-determination.

The politely bowing Japanese now stepped forward to press their economic claims to China's Shantung, which they had captured from the Germans early in the war. But to submit 30,000,000 Chinese to the influence of the Japanese would be another glaring violation of self-determination. The Japanese threatened to bolt the conference, as the Italians had already done, with consequent jeopardy to the League. In the end, Wilson reluctantly consented to a compromise that left the Japanese temporarily in possession of Shantung.

The Treaty of Versailles, as finally signed in June, 1919, included only about four of the original Fourteen Points. The Germans, with considerable justification, gave vent to loud cries of betrayal. But the iron hand of circumstance had forced Wilson to compromise away many of his points in order to salvage his fourteenth point, the League of Nations, which he hoped would iron out the injustices that had crept into the treaty. He was like the mother who throws her younger children to the pursuing wolves in order to save her sturdy first-born son.

Bitter opposition to the completed treaty had already begun to form in America. Tens of thousands of homesick and disillusioned soldiers were pouring home, determined to let Europe "stew in its own juice." The wartime idealism, inevitably doomed to slump, was now plunging to alarming depths. The beloved Allies had apparently turned out to be greedy imperialists. The war to make the world safe for democracy had obviously failed dismally short of the goal. And at the end of the war to end wars there were about twenty conflicts of varying intensity being waged all over the globe.

The critics increased their clamor. Various foreign groups, including the Irish-Americans and the Italian-Americans, were complaining that the interests of the old country had been neglected. Professional liberals, for example the editors of the New Republic, were denouncing the treaty as too harsh. The liberals, far more numerous, were denouncing it as not harsh enough. The Britain-haters, like the buzz-saw Senator James Reed of Missouri and the acid-penned William R. Hearst, were proclaiming that England had emerged with undue influence. Such ultranationalists as the isolationist Senator William E. Borah of Idaho were insisting that the flag of no superstate should be hoisted above the glorious Stars and Stripes.

When the treaty came back from Paris, with the League firmly riveted in, Senator Lodge despair of stopping it.

"What are you going to do? It's hopeless," he complained to Borah. "All the newspapers in my state are for it." The best that he could hope for was to add a few reservations. The Republicans had been given little opportunity to help write the treaty in Paris; they now felt that they were entitled to do a little rewriting in Washington.

Lodge deliberately adopted the technique to delay. As chairman of the powerful Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, he consumed two weeks by reading aloud the entire pact of 214 pages, even though it had already been printed. He then held time-consuming public hearings, during which persons with unpronounceable foreign names aired their grievances against the pact.

Lodge finally adopted the strategy of tacking reservations onto the treaty, and he was able to achieve his goal because of the peculiar composition of the Senate. There were 49 Republicans and 47 Democrats. The Republicans consisted of about twenty "strong reservationists" like Lodge, about twelve "mild reservationists" like future Secretary of State Kellogg, and about a dozen "Irreconcilables." This last group was headed by Senator Borah and the no less isolationist Senator Hiram Johnson of California, a fiery spellbinder.

The Lodge reservations finally broke the back of the treaty. They were all added by a simple majority vote, even though the entire pact would have to be approved by a two-thirds vote. The dozen or so Republican mild reservationists were not happy over the strong Lodge reservations, and if Wilson had deferred sufficiently to these men, he might have persuaded them to vote with the Democrats. Had they done so, the Lodge reservations could have all been voted down, and a milder version, perhaps acceptable to Wilson, could have been substituted.

As the hot summer of 1919 wore on, Wilson became increasingly impatient with the deadlock in the Senate. Finally he decided to take his case to the country, as he had so often done in response to his ingrained "appeal habit." He had never been robust, and his friends urged him not to risk breaking himself down in a strenuous barnstorming campaign. But Wilson, having made up his mind, was unyielding. He had sent American boys into battle in a war to end wars; why should he not risk his life in a battle for a League to end wars?

Wilson's spectacular tour met with limited enthusiasm in the Middle West, the home of several million German-Americans. After him, like baying bloodhounds, trailed Senators Borah and Johnson, sometimes speaking in the same halls a day or so later, to the accompaniment of cries of "Impeach him, impeach him!" But on the Pacific Coast and in the Rocky Mountain area the enthusiasm for Wilson and the League was overwhelming. The high point—and
the breaking point—of the trip came at Pueblo, Colorado, where Wilson, with tears streaming down his cheeks, pleaded for his beloved League of Nations.

That night Wilson’s weary body rebelled. He was whisked back to Washington, where he suffered a stroke that paralyzed the left side of his body. For weeks he lay in bed, a desperately sick man. The Democrats, who had no first-rate leader in the Senate, were left rudderless. With the wisdom of hindsight, we may say that Wilson might better have stayed in Washington, providing the necessary leadership and compromising with the opposition, insofar as compromise was possible. A good deal of compromise had already gone into the treaty, and a little more might have saved it.

Senator Lodge, cold and decisive, was now in the driver’s seat. His Fourteen Reservations, a sardonic parallel to Wilson’s Fourteen Points, had been whipped into shape. Most of them now seem either irrelevant, inconsequential, or unnecessary; some of them merely reaffirmed principles and policies, including the Monroe Doctrine, already guaranteed by the treaty or by the Constitution.

But Wilson, who hated the sound of Lodge’s name, would have no part of the Lodge reservations. They would, he insisted, emasculate the entire treaty. Yet the curious fact is that he had privately worked out his own set of reservations with the Democratic leader in the Senate, Gilbert M. Hitchcock, and these differed only in slight degree from those of Senator Lodge.

As the hour approached for the crucial vote in the Senate, it appeared that public opinion had veered a little. Although confused by the angry debate, it still favored the treaty—but with some safeguarding reservations. A stubborn Wilson was unwilling to accept this disheartening fact, or perhaps he was not made aware of it. Mrs. Wilson, backed by the President’s personal physician, Dr. Gary Grayson, kept vigil at his bedside to warn the few visitors that disagreeable news might shock the invalid into a relapse.

In this highly unfavorable atmosphere, Senator Hitchcock had two conferences with Wilson on the eve of the Senate voting. He suggested compromise on a certain point, but Wilson shot back, “Let Lodge compromise!” Hitchcock conceded that the Senator would have to give ground but suggested that the White House might also hold out the olive branch. “Let Lodge hold out the olive branch,” came the stern reply. On this inflexible note, and with Mrs. Wilson’s anxiety mounting, the interview ended.

The Senate was ready for final action on November 19, 1919. At the critical moment Wilson sent a fateful letter to the Democratic minority in the Senate, urging them to vote down the treaty with the hated Lodge reservations so that a true ratification could be achieved. The Democrats, with more than the necessary one-third veto, heeded the voice of their crippled leader and rejected the treaty with reservations. The Republicans, with more than the necessary one-third veto, rejected the treaty without reservations.

The country was shocked by this exhibition of legislative paralysis. About four-fifths of the senators professed to favor the treaty in some form, yet they were unable to agree on anything. An aroused public opinion forced the Senate to reconsider, and Lodge secretly entered into negotiations with the Democrats in an effort to work out acceptable reservations. He was making promising progress when Senator Borah got wind of his maneuvers through an anonymous telephone call. The leading irreconcilables hastily summoned a council of war, hauled Lodge before them, and bluntly accused him of treachery. Deeply disturbed, the Massachusetts Senator said: “Well, I suppose I'll have to resign as majority leader.”

“No, by God!” burst out Borah. “You won’t have a chance to resign! On Monday, I’ll move for the election of a new majority leader and give the reasons for my action.” Faced with an upheaval within his party such as had insured Wilson’s election in 1912, Lodge agreed to drop his backstage negotiations.

The second-chance vote in the Senate came on March 19, 1920. Wilson again directed his loyal Democratic following to reject the treaty, disfigured as it was by the hateful Lodge reservations. But by this time there was no other form in which the pact could possibly be ratified. Twenty-one realistic Democrats turned their backs on Wilson and voted Yea; 23 loyal Democrats, mostly from the rock-ribbed South, joined with the irreconcilables to do the bidding of the White House. The treaty, though commanding a simple majority this time of 49 Yea to 35 Nays, failed of the necessary two-thirds vote.

Wilson, struggling desperately against the Lodge reservation trap, had already summoned the nation in “solemn referendum” to give him a vote in favor of the League in the forthcoming presidential election of 1920. His hope was that he could then get the treaty approved without reservations. But this course was plainly futile. Even if all the anti-League senators up for re-election in 1920 had been replaced by the pro-League senators, Wilson would still have lacked the necessary two-thirds majority for an unreserved treaty.

The American people were never given a chance to express their views directly on the League of Nations. All they could do was vote either for the weak Democratic candidate, Cox, who stood for the League, and the stuffed-shirt
Republican candidate, Harding, who wobbled all over the map of the League arguments. If the electorate had been given an opportunity to express itself, a powerful majority probably would have favored the world organization, with at least some reservations. But wearied of Wilsonism, idealism, and self-denial, and confused by the wavy fight over the treaty, the voters rose up and swept Harding into the White House on a tidal wave of votes. The winner had been more anti-League than pro-League, and his prodigious plurality of 7,000,000 votes condemned the League to death in America.

What caused this costly failure of American statesmanship?

Wilson's physical collapse intensified his native stubbornness. A judicious compromise here and there no doubt would have secured Senate approval of the treaty, though of course with modifications. Wilson believed that in any event the Allies would reject the Lodge reservations. The probabilities are that the Allies would have worked out some kind of acceptance, so dire was their need of America's economic support, but Wilson never gave them a chance to act.

Senator Lodge was also inflexible, but prior to the second rejection he was evidently trying to get the treaty through—on his own terms. As majority leader of the Republicans, his primary task was to avoid another fatal split in his party. Wilson's primary task was to get the pact approved. From a purely political point of view, the Republicans had little to gain by engineering ratification of a Democratic treaty.

The two-thirds rule in the Senate, often singled out as the culprit, is of little relevance. Wilson almost certainly would have pigeonholed the treaty if it had passed with the Lodge reservations appended.

Wilson's insistence that the League be wedded to the treaty actually contributed to the final defeat of both. Either would have had a better chance if it had not been burdened by the enemies of the other. The United Nations, one should note, was set up in 1945 independently of any peace treaty.

Finally, American public opinion in 1919–20 was not yet ready for the onerous new world responsibilities that had suddenly been forced upon it. The isolationist tradition was still potent, and it was fortified by postwar disillusionment. If the sovereign voters had spoken out for the League with one voice, they almost certainly would have had their way. A treaty without reservations, or with a few reservations acceptable to Wilson, doubtless would have slipped through the Senate. But the American people were one war short of accepting leadership in a world organization for peace.

Professor Bailey has written such books as Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace, Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal, A Diplomatic History of the American People, and the recently published The American Pageant.